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Eternal Student Loan Liability: Who Can Sue Under 20
U.S.C. § 1091a?
Glenn E. Roper1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The Federal Student Aid office of the U.S. Department of Education
administers billions of dollars in postsecondary student aid—as of 2004,
the outstanding student loan portfolio totaled $357 billion.2 Over sixty
percent of all college graduates in the nation have taken advantage of
some kind of federal loan.3 These student loans can be generally divided
into two types: (1) some are made directly by the federal government
under the Direct Loan program,4 but (2) most are made by private lenders
under the auspices of the Federal Family Education Loan program
(“FFEL”). Although the Department of Education oversees FFEL loans,
“guaranty agencies”—state or nonprofit institutions that contract with the
federal government to supervise the FFEL—do the day-to-day
administration of the FFEL.5 The actual payment and loan processing is
1. J.D. 2005, Brigham Young University Law School. My thanks to the Journal editors for
their careful and thorough editing and for their suggestions. Also, thanks to Joseph Cotterman and
Mary Torrez for their help with the Ms. Baker sources (and to Joe for letting me work on the case).
Most of all, my thanks to my wife, Julie, and son, Derek, for their enduring support, love, and
confidence.
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 1, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/fsa/04annualreport.pdf.
3. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION
2004 99 (2004), http://nces.ed. gov/pubs2004/2004077.pdf (2004) (indicating that 65.4% of
graduates received federal loans). Federal loans include Perkins loans, Stafford subsidized loans,
Stafford unsubsidized loans, PLUS Loans, and Supplemental Loans to Students. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE STUDENT GUIDE 2, http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/
attachments/siteresources/Stud_guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
4. In the Federal Direct Loan program, loans are paid directly to the student (or to the
school on the student’s behalf) by the federal government. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a–1087j (1994).
For fiscal year 2004, “the Department awarded $13.2 billion in net loans to 1.9 million Direct Loan
Program recipients.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE
REPORT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2004
7,
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/fsa/04annualreport.pdf. That number does not include $6.3 billion in consolidation loans. Id.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1085(j) (1994); DEANNE LOONIN, STUDENT LOAN LAW 3 (National
Consumer Law Center 2002). Extensive requirements for the agreement with the government are
found in 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b) (1994). Nearly every state has a guaranty agency. See Education
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usually done either directly through the borrowers’ schools or through
commercial lenders—generally banks or other financial institutions.6 The
federal government guarantees these privately funded loans, such that in
the case of student default, the lender can, assuming it has taken the
required “due diligence” steps in attempting to collect the loan,7 be
repaid by the relevant guaranty agency.8 The guaranty agency then takes
assignment of the delinquent loan and seeks to collect from the borrower.
“After approximately four years,” defaulted loans not collected by the
guaranty agency are assigned to the Department of Education.9
The rising frequency of default on student loans in the 1980s10—
among other factors11—led Congress in 1991 to amend section 1091a of
the federal loan program12 such that, for certain specified lenders and
governmental entities listed in the statute, “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of statute, regulation, or administrative limitation, no limitation
shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment
may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or
taken” to collect on delinquent student loans.13 Essentially, this
Resource Organizations Directory, State Guaranty Agency, http://wdcrobcolp01.ed.gov
/programs/erod/org_list.cfm?category_cd=SGA (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
6. An organization that may qualify as an “eligible lender” includes “a National or State
chartered bank, a mutual savings bank, a savings and loan association, a stock savings bank, or a
credit union” that meets certain requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1085(d) (1994).
7. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.411, 682.507. See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1080(d), 1085(f) (1994).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(a) (1994). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FEDERAL
STUDENT AID, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2004 app. A, Notes to Principal
Financial Statements 10 (2004), http://www. ed.gov/about/offices/list/fsa/04annualreport.pdf (2005).
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2004 app. A, Notes to Principal Financial Statements 10 (2004),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/fsa/04annualreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) http://www
.ed.gov /about/offices/list/fsa/04annualreport.pdf (2005).
10. The default rate peaked in 1990 at an astounding 22.4%. National Student Loan Cohort
Default Rates, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005).
11. For a description of an unfavorable court decision which resulted in a circuit split and
helped prompt the amendment, see infra Part III.A.2.
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (1994).
13. Id. § 1091a(a)(2) (emphasis added). The full text of the statute reads:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute, regulation, or administrative
limitation, no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a
judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken
by—
(A) an institution that receives funds under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of
chapter 34 of Title 42 that is seeking to collect a refund due from a student on a grant
made, or work assistance awarded, under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of
chapter 34 of Title 42;
(B) a guaranty agency that has an agreement with the Secretary under section 1078(c) of
this title that is seeking the repayment of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made
under part B of this subchapter after such guaranty agency reimburses the previous holder
of the loan for its loss on account of the default of the borrower;
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amendment provided that once a student contracts for a student loan, the
student cannot use a statute of limitations as a defense against collection
on that loan by the entities listed in the statute—ever.
B. The Issue — Scope of Section 1091a
However, the reach of the amended section 1091a is unclear. Most
importantly, it is unsettled whether—or in what circumstances—the
statute also exempts entities that are not specifically listed in section
1091a from statutes of limitations when they take assignment of student
loans. This is a critical question, because if all non-listed entities can also
rely on section 1091a’s exemption, the potential liability of delinquent
borrowers is greatly expanded. Defaulted student loans, amounting to
billions of dollars,14 could be revived at any time, even many years down
the road, by anyone who could gain assignment of those loans. Private
lenders and collection agencies could thus act as “private attorneys
general” of sorts in ensuring repayment of valid student loan debts.
However, it would also mean that the government would have less
control over collection practices for long-defaulted student loans. On the
other hand, if non-listed entities cannot use section 1091a, then only the
entities listed in the statute—mostly federal agencies—will devote
resources to collecting on long-defaulted loans.15 There are obviously
important policies at play, and billions of dollars at stake.
C. Overview—How the Courts Have Interpreted Section 1091a
Although nearly fourteen years have passed since Congress amended
section 1091a, no reported decision directly answers whether that

(C) an institution that has an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to section 1087c or
1087cc(a) of this title that is seeking the repayment of the amount due from a borrower
on a loan made under part C or D of this subchapter after the default of the borrower on
such loan; or
(D) the Secretary, the Attorney General, or the administrative head of another Federal
agency, as the case may be, for payment of a refund due from a student on a grant made
under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42, or for the
repayment of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under this subchapter and
part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42 that has been assigned to the Secretary
under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42.
Id.
14. According to government figures available in 1999, “13.3 million loans worth $26.7
billion are in default.” Edward Walsh, Lawsuits Over Student Loans Rise; U.S. Hires More
Collection Lawyers to Pursue Defaulters, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1999, at A4. That number has
presumably grown in the intervening years.
15. The government does, however, rely on collection agencies and, if that fails, lawsuits
brought by the Justice Department. See id.
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statute’s exemption applies to non-listed entities.16 For a multi-billion
dollar question of federal statutory interpretation, this may be somewhat
unusual. However, this dearth of reported precedent is probably due to
three factors. First, when lenders or collection agencies contact or file
suit against a debtor seeking to recover a long-past-due student loan debt,
a debtor may simply pay the debt rather than contest it. Second, a debtor
may simply ignore a filed complaint, in which case a default judgment
will be entered against her and she will have no opportunity to contest
application of the statute.17 Third, although the aggregate amount of
defaulted student loans is very large, the amount of each individual
defaulted loan is typically small;18 thus, litigation is frequently in small
claims courts, which generally do not report decisions nor create binding
precedent. These three factors not only explain the lack of reported
decisions, but also highlight the importance of a thorough analysis of the
scope of section 1091a, such as this article attempts—it seeks to provide
an answer to a difficult question where no answer is forthcoming from
the bench.
Despite the lack of a published case directly on point, various cases
have addressed the scope of section 1091a issue in passing. Numerous
recent court opinions have described the scope of section 1091a broadly:
for example, they have stated that in enacting section 1091a, “Congress
eliminated all statutes of limitations [for student loans]”19 or have
referred to section 1091a as “eliminat[ing] all limitations defenses for
collection of student debts.”20 This language would appear to exempt any
holder of a student loan from statutes of limitations—regardless of
whether that entity is mentioned in section 1091a. However, these courts
probably did not intend to address the scope of section 1091a, and such
language seems contrary to the rule that “[i]n construing a statute [the
courts] are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used.”21 Construing section 1091a to apply to any holder of student loans

16. In the unpublished opinion Accounts Portfolio L.P. v. Cortigene, No. 14-95-00037-CV,
1996 WL 65385 (Tex. App. Feb. 15, 1996), the court raised the question of section 1091a’s
applicability to non-listed entities but the court decided the case on other grounds.
17. “[A]ccording to Assistant U.S. Attorney Eneid Francis, . . . most cases end in a default
judgment against the debtor.” David A Fahrenthold, Unpaid School Loans Attacked: Uncle Sam
Sues Deadbeat Debtors, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 12, 1999, at A1.
18. Walsh, supra note 14 (“The average loan in default is about $ 2,000.”); Fahrenthold,
supra note 17 (“[M]ost debts are near the national average of $2,500, though they range from about
$1,000 to more than $70,000.”).
19. Lee v. Paige, 376 F.3d 1179, 1180 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), vacated on other
grounds, Spellings v. Lee, —- S. Ct. —-, 2005 WL 470904 (2005). See also cases cited infra notes
94–97.
20. United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
21. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
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would render the listing of entities in that statute superfluous.22 Thus, the
discussion in these cases does not decide the issue of section 1091a’s
scope.
D. Outline of Article
This article seeks to answer the question of whether entities not listed
in section 1091a are exempt from statutes of limitations. It concludes,
based on the text and history of section 1091a and through analogy to
other lines of precedent, that non-listed entities can only take advantage
of section 1091a’s exemption with respect to a loan if they were assigned
that loan by one of the entities listed in the statute. Otherwise, they
should be subject to statutes of limitations in their collection efforts. Part
II describes the relevant parties in the question of the scope of section
1091a—lenders and “extended purchasers”—and presents, as a case
study, a recent case where an extended purchaser attempted to use
section 1091a to avoid a statute of limitations. Part III analyzes the text
and history of section 1091a and looks at how courts have interpreted
that statute. Part IV explains and rejects an argument in favor of
universal application of section 1091a. It argues instead, based on
analogies to two separate lines of cases, that the only non-listed entities
who should be exempt under section 1091a are those who take
assignment from an entity listed in that section. Part V offers a brief
conclusion.
II. NON-LISTED ENTITIES: LENDERS AND EXTENDED PURCHASERS
There are two kinds of non-listed entities who could seek to take
advantage of section 1091a: non-listed lenders and what this Article
refers to as “extended purchasers.” As to the first group, although
educational institutions acting as lenders are listed in section 1091a,
financial institutions and other private lenders are not. Thus, the majority
of lenders fall under the umbrella of “non-listed entities” who may seek
to avoid statutes of limitations by relying on section 1091a. The second
type of non-listed entity is the “extended purchaser.” This Part briefly
defines the term “extended purchaser” and then, to highlight the question
of section 1091a’s scope, presents an actual scenario where an extended
purchaser attempted to use section 1091a to collect on a student loan.

22. See Beisler v. C.I.R., 814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We should avoid an
interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it superfluous and does not give effect to all of the
words used by Congress.”).
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A. “Extended Purchaser” Defined
Often, the original lenders of student loans will assign those loans to
private buyers23 on the “secondary market.”24 The secondary buyers then
become the substituted “owners” of the loans and receive any interest
and repayment. Sometimes, the assigned loan is not in default, but the
original lender assigns the loan in an effort to raise capital.25 If the need
for capital is particularly urgent—for example, due to a rocky financial
condition—the lender may sell the loan for less than its face value as an
incentive for a quick sale. Others of these secondary market sales are of
already-defaulted loans, where the lender or the government “sells” the
defaulted loan—generally at a discount—to avoid the nuisance of trying
to collect on the loan.26 Secondary purchasers may in turn sell the most
difficult-to-collect of the defaulted loans at an even greater discount to
other purchasers willing to take even more risks.27 This article refers to
all subsequent resales—secondary or more removed—as made on the
“extended market.” It refers to all buyers on the extended market as
“extended purchasers.”
B. A Case Study: Dunstone and Ms. Baker
In the summer of 1987, Ms. Baker28—tired of the minimum wage
jobs that she had been working—decided that she would like instead to
become a beautician and hairdresser. She located a suitable college in her
23. “Often the original lender will sell the loan to another lender specializing in student
loans . . . .” LOONIN, supra note 5, at 3.
24. “A secondary market is one where goods, services, or securities previously issued,
bought, or sold are made available for further buying or selling.” Jason T. Strickland, The Proposed
Regulatory Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: An Analysis, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 267, 268
n.12 (2004). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 1999).
25. LOONIN, supra note 5, at 35 (“Often a FFEL originating lender will sell the loan before
default to Sallie Mae or some other secondary market lender.”).
26. Lenders particularly may be willing to sell loans on the extended market because of the
possibility that the government will refuse to reimburse the lender at student default. See Annotation,
Rights and Obligations of Federal Government, Under 20 U.S.C.S. § 1080, when Student Borrower
Defaults on Federally Insured Loan, 73 A.L.R. FED. 303, 307 (1985) (“Lenders’ claims have been
denied for, inter alia, insufficient documentation, for lending sums beyond those authorized by the
government, and, generally, for failure to pursue collection actions with due diligence.”) (footnotes
omitted); see also, e.g., Am. Bank of San Antonio v. United States, 633 F.2d 543 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
Am. Sav. v. Bell, 562 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1981); Citizens Sav. v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C.
1979); Knoxville Bus. Coll. v. Boyer, 451 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). Buying such loans can be
a very risky investment for the secondary market purchaser, since the defaulting student may be no
longer in the state, insolvent, or bankrupt.
27. Although there is theoretically no limit to the number of links in the chain of sale of these
loans, it is presumably rare to have more than two or three such links.
28. This scenario is based on actual facts from a pro bono case in which the author
participated. Ms. Baker’s name has been changed for purposes of anonymity.
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hometown of Phoenix, Arizona, and prepared to begin classes that fall.
To help finance her vocational education, Ms. Baker turned to the
Federal Student Loan Program and was approved for a governmentguaranteed student loan from MeraBank, a local savings and loan. She
signed the necessary paperwork but was diagnosed with multiple
sclerosis before she could begin her studies.29 This debilitating disease
left her in such poor health that she withdrew from her college before the
term began and cancelled the student loan, having neither attended
classes nor received funds in connection with the loan. Although she
eventually substantially recovered from her illness, Ms. Baker abandoned
her aspirations of attending beauty school.
Soon after Ms. Baker withdrew from school, MeraBank, her wouldbe lender, began to suffer troubles of its own. These troubles culminated
in the institution falling victim to the savings and loan crisis of the
1980s.30 In January 1990, MeraBank went into receivership under the
control of the Resolution Trust Corporation.31 Eventually, MeraBank was
dissolved and its papers and effects were presumably warehoused or
disposed of.
Unfortunately, nearly twenty years later, Ms. Baker’s beauty school
dream returned to haunt her. In 2004, she received a copy of a
complaint32 seeking repayment of her abandoned student loan. The
claimant was Dunstone Financial, LLC (“Dunstone”), an Arizona-based
debt collection agency whose website claims: “We specialize in
recovering past due balances and charged-off debt. . . . Results are
guaranteed!”33 Dunstone’s suit was based on the promissory note Ms.
29. Multiple sclerosis (MS) is “[a] chronic disease of the central nervous system (CNS) . . .
[that] results in temporary, repetitive, or sustained disruptions in nerve impulse conduction, causing
symptoms such as muscular weakness, numbness, [and] visual disturbances . . . . MS is a relatively
common disorder: more than 250,000 Americans are affected.” TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, sclerosis, (F.H. Davis ed. 19th ed. 2002).
30. For a description of the savings and loan industry and the associated crisis, the “Enron”
of its day, see Edward L. Ruben, Communing with Disaster: What We Can Learn From the Jusen
and the Savings and Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 79–87 (1997). See also
Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving a factual
account of MeraBank’s demise).
31. The RTC was created by Congress as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) to staunch the massive bankruptcies of financial
institutions in the savings and loan crisis. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.); Marjorie I. Stein, Developments in Banking Law: 1993: VI.
Resolution Trust Corporation, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 57, 57 (1994) (“[The RTC] . . . takes over
insolvent S&Ls, sells their assets, and extinguishes the interests of stockholders by distributing the
proceeds of the sales to them.”).
32. The complaint was filed in the North Valley Justice Court—one of Arizona’s small
claims courts. See SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA, MARICOPA COUNTY, JUSTICE COURTS –
GENERAL INFORMATION, http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/justiceCourts/Info/genInfo.asp
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
33. Dunstone Financial, L.L.C., http://www.dunstone.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
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Baker had signed in 1987, which apparently had survived MeraBank’s
dissolution in 1990 and been acquired by an extended purchaser.34 The
complaint necessarily also claimed that Arizona’s statute of limitations,
which requires that suits on written contracts be brought “within six
years after the cause of action accrues,”35 was inapplicable. Dunstone
argued that, instead, 20 U.S.C. § 1091a “provides that there can be no
time-bar defense in an action brought to collect on a student loan.”
Although Ms. Baker could argue that she never actually received the
loans, that course would entail difficult questions of proof, requiring
financial records and witness testimony regarding a transaction over
twelve years earlier. Her case would be much simpler—and could end
with a motion for summary judgment36—if Dunstone was wrong and
Arizona’s statute of limitations barred collection of the purported loan.
If, on the other hand, Dunstone’s interpretation of section 1091a was
correct, a trial or settlement seemed inevitable.
III. THE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1091A
The example of Ms. Baker frames the question: can a non-listed
entity, such as Dunstone, use 20 U.S.C. § 1091a to avoid statutes of
limitations? Before answering that question, this Part provides necessary
background on section 1091a, particularly the 1991 amendment of that

34. Dunstone claimed to have received assignment of Ms. Baker’s student loan for the
purpose of collection from a mysterious entity called Talisman Partners, LLP (“Talisman”).
Dunstone claimed that Talisman was the eventual purchaser—through at least one intermediary—of
some of MeraBank’s accounts receivable, including Ms. Baker’s account. Talisman thus appears to
be what is known among bankruptcy attorneys as a “vulture investor.” See HILARY ROSENBERG,
THE VULTURE INVESTORS: THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY
FEEDING FRENZY (1992); Suniati Yap, Investing In Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures Or White
Knights?, 2 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 153 (1995). A vulture investor is “[a]n investor who attempts to
profit by buying debt of bankrupt or credit-impaired companies.” Dictionary.com, Vulture Investor,
http://dictionary.reference.com/ search?q=vulture investor (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (quoting
DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S
INVESTOR (2003)).
35. “An action for debt where indebtedness is evidenced by or founded upon a contract in
writing executed within the state shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years after the cause
of action accrues, and not afterward.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-548 (2000). In applying this statute to
the case of promissory notes, the Arizona courts have held that “the cause of action accrues and the
statute of limitations begins to run when the debt becomes due.” Cheatham v. Sahuaro Collection
Serv., Inc., 577 P.2d 738, 740 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Dunstone’s documents listed the purported due
date of Ms. Baker’s loan as December 28, 1991. Thus, were the Arizona statute of limitations to
apply, Dunstone’s claims would have been barred as of December 28, 1997—over six years before
Dunstone filed its complaint.
36. In Arizona, summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, deposition, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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section. Then it describes how courts have interpreted section 1091a and
examines how those interpretations might apply to non-listed entities.
A. The Background and Text of 20 U.S.C. § 1091a
As mentioned above,37 Congress amended the federal student loan
statute as part of the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991.38
This section describes the pre- and post-amendment versions of the
statute and the circuit split that gave rise to the amendment.
1. The 1986 version of section 1091a and the tax refund offset provisions
Before 1991, the federal loan statute provided that the government
could file suit against borrowers of student loans, “[n]otwithstanding any
provision of State law that would set an earlier deadline for filing
suit[,] . . . until 6 years following the date on which the loan is assigned,
transferred, or referred to the Secretary [of Education].”39 Similar
37. See text accompanying notes 12–13.
38. See Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 124 (1991).
39. Pub. L. No. 99-498, § 484A, 100 Stat. 1268 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)
(1986)). The full text of the provision reads:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any provision of State law that would set an earlier deadline
for filing suit –
(1) an institution which receives funds under this title may file suit for collection of a
refund due from a student on a grant made or work assistance awarded under this title
during a period of time extending at least until a date 6 years (exclusive of periods during
which the State statute of limitations period otherwise applicable to the suit would be
tolled under State law) after the date the refund first became due;
(2) a guaranty agency which has an agreement with the Secretary under section 428(c)
may file suit for collection of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under part
B of this title during a period of time extending at least until a date 6 years (exclusive of
periods during which the State statute of limitations period otherwise applicable to the
suit would be tolled under State law) after the date such guaranty agency reimburses the
previous holder of the loan for its loss on account of the default of the borrower;
(3) an institution which has an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to section 463(a)
may file suit for collection of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under part
E of this title during a period of time extending at least until a date 6 years (exclusive of
periods during which the State statute of limitations period otherwise applicable to the
suit would be tolled under State law) after the date of the default of the borrower with
respect to that amount; and
(4) subject to the provisions of section 2416 of title 28 of the United States Code, the
Attorney General may file suit –
(A) for payment of a refund due from a student on a grant made under this title until 6
years following the date on which the refund first became due;
(B) for collection of the amount due the Secretary from a borrower pursuant to section
428(c)(2)(D) and (c)(8) of this title until 6 years following the date on which the loan is
assigned to the Secretary under part B of this title; and
(C) for collection of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under part E until 6
years following the date on which the loan is assigned, transferred, or referred to the
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provisions defined the period in which educational institutions and
guaranty agencies could sue for collection of student loans.40 A lawsuit,
however, was not the only option. A different code provision allowed the
government to offset income tax refunds of delinquent borrowers to
recoup their student loans.41 According to a Treasury Department
regulation, the statute of limitations for using the tax refund offset
method was ten years: “[A] past-due legally enforceable debt which may
be referred by a Federal agency to the Service for offset is a debt . . .
[w]hich, except in the case of a judgment debt, has been delinquent for at
least three months but has not been delinquent for more than ten years at
the time the offset is made.”42
2. Circuit split: Jones and Grider
The federal circuit courts of appeals soon split over the meaning of
the Treasury regulation. First, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
regulation.43 In Jones v. Cavazos,44 a delinquent student borrower, Jones,
challenged the government’s ability to collect on her loan through tax
refund offset. She had defaulted on her college loan in 1974 and, twelve
years later, the Secretary of Education took assignment of that loan for
collection.45 The crux of Jones’ argument was that the Treasury
regulation “creates a ten year federal statute of limitations which begins
to run when the debt first goes into default.”46 Since she had defaulted
over twelve years earlier, Jones argued, the government was barred from
offsetting her taxes. The district court, however, granted summary
judgment for the government, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
appeal. Relying on various other district court cases,47 the Eleventh

Secretary under part E of this title.
Id.
40. Id. Technically, the provision did not set affirmative limitations on those entities, but
merely restricted application of any state statutes of limitations for “at least” six years. Id. A House
report on the bill indicates that it “[p]rovides that at least the six-year Federal statute of limitation for
filing suit by a guaranty agency or the Secretary for collection of a loan would apply if the period
under state law is less than six years.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-383 (1985) (emphasis added).
41. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (Supp. 1989); 26 U.S.C. § 6402 (1989).
42. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-6(T)(b) (1988).
43. However, in an earlier case, in dicta, the Eighth Circuit indicated how it would likely
construe the regulation: “[T]he setoff procedure will not be used to satisfy an obligation which has
been delinquent for more than ten years at the time the offset is made. This does, we think prudently,
place limits upon use of the offset procedure for obligations older than ten years.” Thomas v.
Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165, 1169 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
44. 889 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 1044.
46. Id. at 1047.
47. Roberts v. Bennett, 709 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Hurst v. U. S. Dep’t of Educ., 695
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Circuit determined that the ten-year limitation did not begin to run until
the Department of Education took assignment of the delinquent student
loan.48 Thus, the word “delinquent” in the Treasury regulation meant
delinquent as to the government. In the words of one of the district courts
quoted by the Jones court, “the debt cannot become delinquent until it is
in the hands of the agency requesting the offset.”49
The next year, the Fifth Circuit addressed the same issue in the case
of Grider v. Cavazos.50 There, two students, Grider and Gladecki, had
defaulted on their student loans: Grider in 1975 and Gladecki in 1971.51
The Department of Education took assignment of their loans in 1979.52
In 1986, on behalf of the Department of Education, the IRS offset the tax
refunds of both students. Grider and Gladecki challenged the offset in a
suit filed against the Secretary of Education, but the district court granted
summary judgment for the Secretary, coincidentally issuing its final
judgment the same day that the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in
Jones.53 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court.54 Although it
recognized that its holding created a circuit split,55 the appellate court
could not assent to the Eleventh Circuit’s construction of the word
“delinquent”:
Absent ambiguity, we must not tinker. And try as we might, we fail to
see how the Regulation could be viewed as ambiguous. Delinquent is a
word the meaning of which is universally understood by lawyer and
layman alike when used in reference to a debt. . . . In the face of such
unambiguous language, how can a court justify usurping the legislative
function that was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury by
supplying words such as “in the hands of the Secretary” to modify
“delinquent”?56

Based on this “plain meaning” interpretation of the regulation, the Fifth
Circuit held that the government can only offset tax refunds within ten
F. Supp. 1137 (D. Kan. 1988).
48. Jones, 889 F.2d at 1048–49.
49. Id. at 1048 (quoting Roberts, 709 F. Supp. at 225).
50. 911 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1990). For more information on, and a criticism of, both the
Jones and Grider cases, see Michael Sawyer Smith, Note, Third Party Assignment, Statutes of
Limitation, and the Tax Refund Offset Program: Breathe a Little Easier Student Deadbeats, the Fifth
Circuit Is on Your Side, 46 VAND. L. REV. 443 (1993).
51. 911 F.2d at 1159–60.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1160.
54. Id. at 1165.
55. Id. at 1162.
56. Id. at 1163.
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years of the date of original default.
3. The amended section 1091a
Congress was not long in reacting to the September 1990 Grider
decision. On March 6, 1991, Representative William D. Ford57 of
Michigan introduced the “Higher Education Technical Amendments”
(“HETA”) bill,58 which eventually became the amended section 1091a.59
In the House debates, Representative Ford stated that the bill, in part,
“overcomes a recent circuit court decision that puts in jeopardy the
ability of the Department of Education to collect defaulted student loans
through offsets of income tax refunds and other means.”60 The “decision”
was apparently the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Grider v. Cavazos.61
However, the amendment to section 1091a did much more than
merely reverse the Fifth Circuit’s holding on the meaning of the Treasury
regulation.62 In fact, the revision extended far beyond amending the tax
refund offset provisions—it eliminated all the statutes of limitations that
were previously part of section 1091a. The new text of 1091a(a), as
codified in the United States Code, reads:
(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) It is the purpose of this subsection to ensure
that obligations to repay loans and grant overpayments are enforced
without regard to any Federal or State statutory, regulatory, or
administrative limitation on the period within which debts may be
enforced.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute, regulation, or
administrative limitation, no limitation shall terminate the period within
which suit may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset,
garnishment, or other action initiated or taken by—
(A) an institution that receives funds under this subchapter and part C

57. For whom the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program is named. See 20 U.S.C. §
1087a (1994).
58. See 137 CONG. REC. H1454–05 (Mar 6, 1991).
59. The President signed the bill on April 9th of that year. See 137 CONG. REC. H3422–04
(Apr. 9, 1991).
60. 137 CONG. REC. H1808–02 (Mar. 19, 1991).
61. See Guillermety v. Sec’y of Educ., 241 F. Supp. 2d 727, 754 & n.24 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
Kitchen v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 97 CIV. 9391(DLC), 1998 WL 167325, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9,
1998) (“In 1991, Congress passed the Higher Education Act Technical Amendments (‘HETA’),
which among other things and in response to Grider, abolished the previously applicable statute of
limitations.”).
62. See United States v. Wall, 794 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Or. 1992) (“[A]lthough the
legislative history indicates a desire to deal with the specific issue raised in the Grider case, . . .
Congress did not confine its action to such cases.”).
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of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42 that is seeking to collect a
refund due from a student on a grant made, or work assistance awarded,
under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title
42;
(B) a guaranty agency that has an agreement with the Secretary under
section 1078(c) of this title that is seeking the repayment of the amount
due from a borrower on a loan made under part B of this subchapter
after such guaranty agency reimburses the previous holder of the loan
for its loss on account of the default of the borrower;
(C) an institution that has an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to
section 1087c or 1087cc(a) of this title that is seeking the repayment of
the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under part C or D of
this subchapter after the default of the borrower on such loan; or
(D) the Secretary, the Attorney General, or the administrative head of
another Federal agency, as the case may be, for payment of a refund
due from a student on a grant made under this subchapter and part C of
subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42, or for the repayment of the
amount due from a borrower on a loan made under this subchapter and
part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42 that has been assigned
to the Secretary under this subchapter and part C of subchapter I of
chapter 34 of Title 42.63

Thus, the same entities that were restricted by time limits in the old
section 1091a now had explicit authority to sue to collect student loans,
regardless of any limitations periods.
Further, the “effective date” provision of HETA indicated that
[t]he amendments made by this section shall be effective as if enacted
by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(Public Law 99-272), and shall apply to any actions pending on or after
the date of enactment of the Higher Education Technical Amendments
of 1991 that are brought before November 15, 1992.64

Essentially, as long as a proceeding was “pending” on or after April 9,
1991,65 it was exempt from statutes of limitations. Although the effective
date provision also required the government to bring suit (if at all) prior

63. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (1998).
64. Id. (as codified from § 3(c) of Pub. L. No. 102-26, as amended Pub. L. No. 102-325, Title
XV, § 1551, 106 Stat. 838 (1992)).
65. The date on which the Higher Technical Amendments of 1991 was enacted. See 137
CONG. REC. H3422–04 (Apr. 9, 1991).
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to November 15, 1992, Congress soon revoked this “sunset provision.”66
4. Courts determine the scope of section 1091a’s retroactivity
With its newfound freedom from time restrictions, the Department of
Education began to pursue defaulted loans with renewed vigor. Court
cases examining the scope of amended section 1091a began springing
up, while delinquent borrowers sought to contest this new onslaught. The
most significant holding of the resulting court decisions was that
amended section 1091a applies retroactively to avoid all statutes of
limitations, regardless of when the loan went into default.
Although apparently no one questions the retroactive effect of
section 1091a, the scope of that retroactivity was not immediately
apparent. In fact, the first federal district court to address the application
of section 1091a apparently viewed it as somewhat limited. In United
States v. Friedenberg,67 decided in September of 1991, the district court
applied the newly-amended statute, noting that the effective date
provision “states that [section 1091a] is to be considered effective as if it
were part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985.”68 The Friedenberg court found the statute applicable in that case,
partly because “[i]n 1985, the claim was not time barred.”69 Apparently,
the court read the effective date provision as making section 1091a
retroactively applicable only to those student loans that had not been
barred by the prior six-year limitation70 as of the date of the 1985 Act.71
Thus, under Friedenberg, a loan that went into default in 1979 and was
barred by a statute of limitations in 1984 would not have become
collectible under the section 1091a amendment.
Subsequent cases, however, disagreed with the Friedenberg dictum.
In United States v. Davis,72 the court noted that “[t]he Friedenberg court,
without discussion, apparently concluded that the determining factor
regarding retroactivity of [section 1091a] is whether a student loan debt
was time barred in 1985.”73 The Davis court noted, however, that the

66. Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1551 106 Stat. 448 (July 23, 1992) (“Subsection (c) of section 3
of the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 (Public Law 102-26) is amended by
striking ‘that are brought before November 15, 1992.’”).
67. No. CV-90-0707, 1991 WL 352884 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1991).
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id. Because the case of a claim that was barred in 1985 was not before the court, this
statement is, of course, dicta.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. That date was April 7, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 16041(e) (1986).
72. 142 B.R. 293 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
73. Id. at 296.
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Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which
section 1091a is linked to, “provides as follows: ‘The amendment made
by section 16033 [which sets the statute of limitations for the collection
of defaulted student loans] shall apply to all grants, including grants
awarded before the enactment of this Act.’”74 Thus, because the 1985
Act itself had an effective date provision that applied retroactively
without limit, the Davis court concluded that section 1091a “applies to
all grants, regardless of when those loans were issued or whether claims
for repayment of those grants were still viable on April 7, 1986.”75 Thus,
under Davis, a loan that went into default and was barred by a statute of
limitations before 1985 would still be open to collection under the
amended section 1091a.
Other federal district courts soon agreed with the Davis analysis.76
Moreover, when the federal circuit courts began to address the issue,
they unanimously agreed that the statute applied retroactively without
limit,77 and further held that such application did not violate the ex post
facto clause78 or the due process clause.79 It is thus settled—barring
74. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 16041(e)) (alteration in original).
75. Id. As the Davis court noted, “the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985 . . . (the United States astutely points out) took effect on April 7, 1986, not in 1985.” Id.
76. United States v. Mastrovito, 830 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (D. Ariz. 1993) (noting that
“defendant attempts to circumvent the application of the Amendments with the argument that they
are only retroactive to April 7, 1986” but finding that argument meritless); United States v. Phillips,
No. CV S-92-952-DFL-GGH, 1993 WL 660213, at *4–*8 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 1993) (summarizing
cases); United States v. Hodges, No. 4:92CV1395, 1993 WL 328044 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 1993);
United States v. Cawley, 821 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (E.D. Mich. 1993); United States v. Keil, No.
C92-2822-FMS, 1993 WL 69490 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 1993); United States v. Collins, No. CIV. A.
92-1143, 1993 WL 52103 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1993); United States v. Ward, Civ.A. No. 92-1786,
1992 WL 373557 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1992); United States v. Blair, No. 8:CV91-00587, 1992 WL
506087, at *2 (D. Neb. Jul. 10, 1992) (finding that “the intent and effect of [section 1091a] was to
eliminate the statute of limitations for recovery of defaulted student loan obligations” and that there
is “no constitutional right to the benefit of the particular limitation period that happened to be in
effect when a cause of action accrued”); United States v. Davis, 801 F. Supp. 581, 584 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (“[T]he court concludes . . . that the 1991 Amendments eliminating statutes of limitations for
collection of defaulted student loans apply retroactively to revive claims time-barred under previous
statutes of limitations.”); United States v. Wall, 794 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Or. 1992) (“[G]iven the
legislative history and the plain language of HETA, I find that Congress intended to retroactively
abolish all limitations on the collection of student loans, so that all possible funds could be collected
from student loan defaulters.”); United States v. Daley, No. CS-91-0280-JBH, 1992 WL 106799, at
*2 (E.D. Wash. May 13, 1992) (“Applicable case law and legislative history convince this court that
abolition of the limitations period must be retroactively applied.”).
77. E.g., United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 898 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e hold that the
Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 do revive actions to collect unpaid student loans
that were barred by the statute of limitations before the enactment of that legislation.”). See also
United States v. Distefano, 279 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lawrence, 276
F.3d 193, 195–96 (5th Cir. 2001); Bianco v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 96-6050, 1996 WL 466653
(2d Cir. Aug. 16, 1996); United States v. Johnson, No. 93-16644, 1994 WL 266553 (9th Cir. Jun. 16,
1994); United States v. MacDonald, No. 93-1924, 1994 WL 194248 (6th Cir. May 16, 1994).
78. United States v. Brown, 7 F. App’x. 353 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Singer, No. 965356, 1997 WL 812459 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 10, 1997); United States v. Young, No. 93-16062, 1993 WL
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Supreme Court interference—that section 1091a applies retroactively to
revive all claims on defaulted student loans, even claims that were
previously barred by statutes of limitations.
B. Applying the Text, the Legislative History, and Judicial
Interpretations of Section 1091a to Non-Listed Entities
This section now turns to the ultimate question—whether section
1091a applies to entities not listed in that statute. This section first
examines the text of the statute, then to its legislative history to
determine Congress’s intent with respect to non-listed entities. Next, it
examines the court decisions that have cited and interpreted section
1091a. It concludes that although the court decisions are ambiguous, the
statutory text indicates that the statute should not apply to non-listed
entities.
1. Text and legislative history of section 1091a
As a textual matter, section 1091a is quite clear: there is to be no
limitation on any action taken to collect on defaulted students loans by
(B) a guaranty agency that has an agreement with the Secretary under
section [20 U.S.C. §] 1078(c) . . . ;
(C) an institution that has an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to
section [20 U.S.C. §] 1087c or § 1087cc(a) . . . ; or
(D) the Secretary [of Education], the Attorney General, or the
administrative head of another Federal agency . . . .80

The section specifically limits those who may take advantage of the
exemption from limitations to five categories: guaranty agencies,81
qualifying educational institutions, the Secretary of Education, the
United States Attorney General, and the heads of other federal
agencies.82 Under a strict textualist reading, this would end the inquiry:
526368 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993); United States v. Steele, No. 92-56047, 1993 WL 170956 (9th Cir.
May 20, 1993).
79. United States v. Dauven, No. 97-35362, 1998 WL 276624 (9th Cir. May 22, 1998);
Singer, No. 96-5356, 1997 WL 812459; United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 342 (8th Cir. 1993).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(2)(B)–(D) (1998). Section 1091a(a)(2)(A) deals with institutions
who are “seeking to collect a refund due from a student on a grant made, or work assistance
awarded,” and thus is not applicable in the loan context. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(2)(A).
81. A guaranty agency is a state or nonprofit institution that contracts with the federal
government to supervise the FFEL. See LOONIN, supra note 5, at 3.
82. Further, it defines the kinds of loans each entity can use section 1091a in pursuing:
guaranty agencies can only use it in pursuing Federal Family Education Loans (“FFEL”), 20 U.S.C.
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since non-listed lenders and extended purchasers do not fall into any of
the five categories, they cannot use section 1091a to defend against
statutes of limitations. A broader or less-strict reading of the text, on the
other hand, would take account of the initial statutory language stating
the “purpose” of the amendment—”It is the purpose of this subsection to
ensure that obligations to repay loans and grant overpayments are
enforced without regard to any Federal or State statutory, regulatory, or
administrative limitation on the period within which debts may be
enforced.”83 This “purpose” language is not at all restrictive; in fact,
allowing non-listed entities to avoid statutes of limitations would help
promote the purpose of “ensur[ing] that obligations to repay loans . . . are
enforced.”84 So, there may be some narrow room for arguing that the
amendment was meant to apply more broadly than the narrow list
indicates.
However, this broader “purpose” argument probably does not
ultimately support application of the exemption beyond the listed
entities. The purpose section of a statute can certainly be used to help
give proper context to the statute, but it cannot be used to avoid the
actual text that implements that purpose.85 Although Congress states the
statute’s purpose in section 1091a(a)(1), it is in 1091a(a)(2) that
Congress attempts to implement that purpose. Furthermore, Congress’
implementation, on its face, unquestionably limits the exemption to the
listed categories—there is no indication that the list of entities in section
1091a was intended to be merely illustrative. It is a settled rule of
statutory construction that “[i]n construing a statute[, the courts] are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”86 Thus,
§ 1091a(a)(2)(B) (“[When] seeking the repayment of the amount due from a borrower on a loan
made under part B of this subchapter [the FFEL program] . . . ;”), and educational institutions can
only use it in pursuing Direct Loans or Perkins Loans, Id. §1091a(a)(2)(C) (“[When] seeking the
repayment of the amount due from a borrower on a loan made under part C or D of this subchapter
[Direct and Perkins Loans] . . . ;”). The Secretary of Education, Attorney General, and heads of
administrative agencies are unlimited in their use of section 1091a. See id. § 1091a(a)(2)(D).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(1).
84. Id.
85. As the Supreme Court has said:
[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or
will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
legislative choice, —and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the
law. Where, as here, “the language of a provision . . . is sufficiently clear in its context
and not at odds with the legislative history, . . . ‘[there is no occasion] to examine the
additional considerations of “policy” . . . that may have influenced the lawmakers in their
formulation of the statute.’”
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695
(1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976))).
86. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). See also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes
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one should not look merely to the “purpose” language of section 1091a
and ignore the specific list of entities. Construing section 1091a to apply
more broadly than this list would render the listing of entities
superfluous.87
Thus, looking solely to the text of section 1091a, it is fairly clear that
non-listed entities are foreclosed from using the statute. Some additional
support for this position can be found in the record of the debates and
legislative history surrounding the HETA88—nearly all the commentary
in the debates focused solely on allowing the federal government
additional latitude in collecting on defaulted student loans. As mentioned
above,89 the sponsor of the bill stated that the bill was intended to reverse
the Grider decision, which had “put[] in jeopardy the ability of the
Department of Education to collect defaulted student loans through
offsets of income tax refunds and other means.”90 Other representatives
referred to the bill as furthering the federal government’s ability to offset
federal income tax refunds.91 Similarly, in the related Senate debates, one
Senator maintained that “the legislation assures that the Department of
Education will not be limited in its ability to collect defaulted guaranteed
student loans through the tax refund offset program.”92 Although these
comments do not require that the statute was limited to helping the
federal government, they at least indicate that the intent of the only
members of Congress who commented on the statute was to provide an
exemption for the federal government, not for non-listed entities.93 When
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992) (“[I]t is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See Beisler v. C.I.R., 814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We should avoid an
interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it superfluous and does not give effect to all of the
words used by Congress.”).
88. This history is related here in full recognition of the arguments, most visibly championed
by Justice Scalia, against giving undue weight to such considerations. See, e.g., United States v.
Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(referring to legislative history as “that last hope of lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the
hagiology of statutory construction”); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
89. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
90. 137 CONG. REC. H1808–02 (Mar. 19, 1991) (statement of Rep. Ford) (emphasis added).
91. “[T]his bill removes the 10-year statute of limitations on IRS offset collections from
student loan defaulters.” Id. (statement of Rep. Coleman); “[T]hese amendments change the statute
of limitations for collecting defaulted student loans through IRS offsets of tax refunds . . . . Some
questions have arisen regarding the running of the statute of limitations. The amendment would life
the statute of limitations for all time [and] would apply it retroactively.” Id. (statement of Rep.
Goodling).
92. 137 CONG. REC. S4089–01 (Mar. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) (emphasis
added).
93. See Guillermety v. Sec’y of Educ., 241 F. Supp. 2d 727, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“[W]hile
the 1991 amendment to the HEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1091a, was broad and general in its textual language,

35]

ETERNAL STUDENT LOAN LIABILITY

53

the comments in the legislative history are taken in combination with the
plain text of the statute, section 1091a does not apply to non-listed
entities.
2. The conflicting court decisions
Despite the restrictive language and apparent legislative purpose of
the amended section 1091a, some court cases interpreting that section
have spoken of the exemption broadly. Taking the language of those
courts at face value, it would appear that they see no need to restrict the
application of section 1091a to the listed entities. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that “it appears to us that Congress intended the
HETA amendments to apply retroactively to all student loan collection
actions” and that “Congress intended to revive all time-barred actions to
recover defaulted student loans.”94 Similarly, from the Fifth Circuit:
“Today we . . . conclude that § 1091a eliminates all limitations defenses
for collection of student debts.”95 An unpublished Second Circuit opinion
stated that section 1091a “retroactively eliminated the statutes of
limitations on all actions (including tax offsets) to recover on defaulted
student loans.”96 And many other federal court decisions contain
similarly broad language.97
it was narrowly focused on a particular problem-the ability of the federal government to collect
delinquent student loans through the offset of federal tax refunds.”).
94. United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
95. United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
96. Bianco v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 96-6050, 1996 WL 466653 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 1996)
(emphasis added).
97. United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress provided that
actions to collect on defaulted student loans were no longer subject to any statute of limitations.”);
Lee v. Paige, 276 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (W.D. Mo. 2003) (“In 1991, Congress eliminated all statutes
of limitations on the collection of student loans . . . . The effect of [section 1091a] was to abrogate all
statutes of limitations that would have barred the collection of past due student loans.”), aff’d, 376
F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Spellings v. Lee, —- S. Ct. —-, 2005 WL
470904 (2005); United States v. King, No. Civ. 2001-31, 2002 WL 31628438, at *2 (D.V.I. Sept. 19,
2002) (“Section 1091a eliminates any statute of limitations bar on the collection of student loan
obligations.”); United States v. Wall, 794 F. Supp. 350, 352 (D. Or. 1992) (“[T]he HETA of 1991
removed any statute of limitations for student loans. . . . [G]iven the legislative history and the plain
language of HETA, I find that Congress intended to retroactively abolish all limitations on the
collection of student loans, so that all possible funds could be collected from student loan
defaulters.”); United States v. Walker, 795 F. Supp. 1073, 1073 (N.D. Okla. 1992) (“[T]he Higher
Education Technical Amendments of 1991[] abrogated all limitation periods affecting collection of
defaulted student loans.”); United States v. Smith, 811 F. Supp. 646, 647–48 (S.D. Ala. 1992)
(“There is no longer a statute of limitation on student loans, and none has existed since April, 1991.
Section 3 of the Higher Education Technical Amendments Act, P.L. 102-26, enacted April 9, 1991,
eliminated any statute of limitations that applied to suits brought to collect Education-financed
student loans.”); In re Cota, 298 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (“There is no statute of
limitations for a student loan debt. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(1). See also 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges
and Universities § 21 (2003) (“The Higher Education Technical Amendments eliminated all statutes
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However, this broad language was almost certainly imprecise; most
likely, the courts never even considered the prospect of non-listed
entities attempting to use the exemption of section 1091a. Moreover,
other courts—more thorough in their analysis and precise in their
phrasing—have recognized the restrictive language of section 1091a. For
example, a Ninth Circuit case specifically rejected a debtor’s claim that a
statute of limitations barred collection of the debt because the creditor
was a guaranty agency that “has an agreement with the Secretary of
Education,” as required in section 1091a(a)(2)(B).98 Other courts,
addressing the issue in passing, have used significant qualifications on
their language. For example, a federal district court in the District of
Columbia stated that section 1091a “eliminated the bar of any statute of
limitations on government collection of student loans financed by the
Department of Education.”99 Similarly, a federal district court in
Alabama stated that the section “provides that litigation may be
commenced, a judgment enforced, or a garnishment or offset action
taken by the Federal government to collect defaulted loans regardless of
any Federal or state statutes of limitation.”100 And from a Pennsylvania
bankruptcy court: “[Section 1091a] has eliminated the running of any
statute of limitations against federal assignees of student loan debts.”101
Perhaps the most exacting analysis came in the Indiana bankruptcy

of limitation on actions to recover on defaulted student loans and therefore revives actions against
defendants on which original statute of limitation would have run.”).
98. Millard v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 66 F.3d 252, 253 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the
statute only requires that the agency “has” an agreement, the court further held that it was immaterial
whether the guaranty agency had an agreement at the time the loan was serviced—all that the court
apparently required is that the agency have an agreement at the time of trial. Id.
99. Foster v. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (emphasis added). However, it
should be noted that when the Foster court cited the statute, they omitted the list of entities that can
use the statute, quoting only that “no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be
filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken.” Id.
In addition, it can be argued that the quotation in the text overstates the case, because guaranty
agencies and educational institutions—which are often not part of the government—are allowed to
use the statute. However, given the agreements with the federal government that allow those
institutions to participate in the federal loan program, it is not much of a stretch to say that they are
acting based on delegation from the government.
100. United States v. Smith, 811 F. Supp. 646, 648 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (emphasis added). This
statement was arguably limited to the federal government only because that is who was pursuing the
claim—an especially compelling conclusion given the court’s broad characterization of the statute in
another part of its opinion. See supra note 97. However, the court later states that “[t]his
resuscitative legislation is not an unusual action, and the courts have clearly recognized that
Congress has the power to revive a time-barred claim held by the government.” 811 F. Supp. at 648.
Because this statement is made in support the constitutionality of section 1091a, an argument can be
made that the court considered the amendment to only apply to the government.
101. In re Hankerson, 133 B.R. 711, 713 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (emphasis added), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Hankerson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 138 B.R. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1992) and
Matter of Pettis, 146 B.R. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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case of In re Loving.102 In that case, Ms. Loving had obtained student
loans from the government, which ended up being assigned to the
Education Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”).103 After Ms.
Loving declared and had been discharged from bankruptcy, ECMC
contacted her seeking repayment of the loans.104 In a preemptive suit
filed against ECMC, Ms. Loving claimed that ECMC was time-barred
from attempting to collect on her old student loans, now over ten years
old.105 In rejecting this claim, the bankruptcy court stated that
[b]y virtue of 20 U.S.C. § 1091a, Congress has eliminated any time
constraint on the United States’ (or a guaranty agency[‘s]) collection
of student loan obligations. . . . As a guarantor of the Loans, ECMC is
not subject to any statute of limitations or equitable doctrine in
pursuing Loving for the balance due under the Loans.”106

As the emphasized text highlights, the court recognized that the
scope of section 1091a was limited to the entities listed therein.
Furthermore, in a footnote, the court recognized that “ECMC did not
introduce evidence that it has ‘an agreement with the Secretary under
section 1087c or 1087cc(a);’ however, Loving did not object to ECMC’s
statement that it qualifies as a student loan guarantor and, thus, any
argument to the contrary has been waived.”107 The Loving court thus
recognized that, to qualify under 1091a, ECMC had to fall within one of
the five categories listed in that statute. The court apparently would have
required evidence to that effect had Ms. Long not waived the issue.
As this brief overview shows, the language from the court cases is
somewhat conflicting. Although many cases speak of section 1091a in
broad terms, there are also cases that seem to recognize the limited scope
of that provision. Stepping back from the particular cases, however, it
should be noted that there is an arguably significant trend in the reported
decisions. Although 1091a has been used to exempt guaranty agencies108
102. 269 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2001).
103. Id. at 656.
104. Id. at 657. Student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless certain conditions are
met. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
105. 269 B.R. at 656, 662.
106. Id. at 663 (emphasis added and footnote deleted).
107. Id.
108. Millard v. United Student Aid Funds, 66 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 1995); Lovitt v. Tex.
Guaranteed Student Loan Corp., No. 3-05-CV-0175-BD, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12677 (N.D. Tex.
June 27, 2005); In re Kaufman, No. 3:02-0650, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23903 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14,
2002); Thompson v. N.M. Student Loan Guarantee Corp., 329 B.R. 145 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In
re Loving, 269 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2001); Higher Educ. Assistance Found., Inc. v. GlennHealy, 836 P.2d 25 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Barry, 267
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(as in 1091a(a)(2)(B)), institutions of higher education109 (as in
1091a(a)(2)(A) and (C)), and the Secretary of Education or the Attorney
General110 (as in 1091a(a)(2)(D)) from statutes of limitations, there is not
A.D.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Upshur, 252 A.D.2d
333 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Starr, 179 A.D.2d 992 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992); N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Laudenslager, 161 Misc. 2d 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1994); N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Pratcher, 156 Misc. 2d 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
109. Univ. of New England v. Leeman, CV000082767S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1350
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2002); State v. Shaw, 189 A.D.2d 1057 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
110. Lockhart v. United States, 376 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, —- S. Ct. —-, 2005 WL
3299398 (2005) (describing section 1091a as “a limited exception to the Debt Collection Act time
bar in the student loan context”); United States v. Distefano, 279 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d
341 (8th Cir. 1993); Hamilton v. United States, Case No. 2:03-CV-669, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24051 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2005); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Civil Action No. 05-0237, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20289 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2005); Roth v. United States, Civil File No. 02-820
(PAM/RLE), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12931 (D. Minn. July 22, 2003); Guillermety v. Sec’y of
Educ., 241 F. Supp. 2d 727 (E.D. Mich. 2002); United States v. Charles, 240 F. Supp. 2d 488
(M.D.N.C. 2002); United States v. Holmes, 3:01-CV-0935 NPM/GLS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6455
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2002); United States v. Klein, No. 00 C 6301, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21408
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2001); United States v. Lewis, Case No. 01-2006-JWL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9909 (D. Kan. Jun. 29, 2001); United States v. Makler, Civil Action No. 00-239, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11306 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2000); United States v. Washington, Case No. 99-CV-72165-DT,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4422 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2000); United States v. Durbin, 64 F. Supp. 2d
635 (S.D. Tex. 1999); United States v. Dwelley, 59 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D. Me. 1999); United
States v. McLaughlin, 7 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 1998); United States v. Smith, 862 F. Supp. 257
(D. Haw. 1994); Foster v. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1993) (filed against the U.S. Secretary
of Education); United States v. Cawley, 821 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (E.D. Mich. 1993); United States
v. Robbins, 819 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Mich. 1993); United States v. Shoemaker, Case No. 93-2113KHV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19500 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 1993); United States v. Southworth, Civil
Action 93-0406-P-S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16922 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 15, 1993); United States v.
Vanhoutteghem, Case No. 93-71789, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18773 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1993);
United States v. Harris, No. C-92-4155 M (CW), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11519 (N.D. Cal. May 5,
1993); United States v. Keil, No. C92-2822-FMS, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2971 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8,
1993); United States v. Collins, Civil Action No. 92-1143, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2315 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 24, 1993); United States v. Sellers, Civil Action 92-0637-T-M, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1494
(S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 1993); United States v. Davis, 801 F. Supp. 581 (M.D. Ala. 1992); United States
v. Wall, 794 F. Supp. 350 (D. Or. 1992); In re Hankerson, 133 B.R. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Hankerson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 138 B.R. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
and Matter of Pettis, 146 B.R. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. Ward, Civil Action No. 92-1786
Section “N”, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18798 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1992); United States v. Daley, No. CS91-0280-JBH, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7001 (E.D. Wash. May 13, 1992); United States v. Robinson,
Civil Action No. 90-2915-LFO, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4818 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1992); United States
v. Friedenberg, No. CV-90-0707, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15440 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1991); United
States v. Brown, 7 F. App’x 353 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Motley, No. 00-1206, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33375 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2000); United States v. Dauven, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10608
(9th Cir. May 22, 1998); United States v. Singer, No. 96-5356, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 37559 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 10, 1997); United States v. Johnson, No. 93-16644, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15548 (9th
Cir. June 16, 1994); United States v. MacDonald, No. 93-1924, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11280 (6th
Cir. May 16, 1994); United States v. Mastrovito, No. 93-16768, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 323 (9th Cir.
Jan. 6, 1995); United States v. Young, No. 93-16062, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34107 (9th Cir. Dec.
20, 1993); United States v. Steele, No. 92-56047, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12831 (9th Cir. May 20,
1993); United States v. Hammad, No. 92-1771, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 22920 (4th Cir. Sept. 16,
1992); United States v. Kral, No. 89-16551, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11988 (9th Cir. June 4, 1991);
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a single reported case where a non-listed entity has used section 1091a to
avoid a statute of limitations. In Accounts Portfolio L.P. v. Cortigene,111
the only reported case where a non-listed entity moved to qualify under
section 1091a, the court denied the motion on other grounds and thus did
not address the question of whether the statute applies to non-listed
entities.112 Of course, the fact that no appellate court has ever applied
section 1091a to an extended purchaser must not be overemphasized—
the proper case may simply not have arisen in a reporting court.113
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR APPLYING SECTION 1091A TO NON-LISTED
ENTITIES
Thus, the text of the statute itself appears to restrict the statute to the
listed entities. However, no reported precedent gives a solid answer to
the question of a non-listed entity’s claim for application of section
1091a, and the language from the courts is generally broad. Thus, nonlisted entities—like Dunstone114—can and do argue that they should fall
within section 1091a’s umbrella. This Part therefore turns to extra-textual
arguments for application of section 1091a to non-listed entities.
A. An (Unpersuasive) Argument for Universal Exemption
In the case of Ms. Baker, Dunstone propounded an argument by
which section 1091a would apply to any holder of a defaulted student
loan. It supported this argument for universal exemption by an analogy to
interest rates. This section examines that argument and concludes that it
is ultimately unavailing and should be rejected.
1. The argument’s broad scope
Dunstone apparently recognized that it did not fall under the literal
language of section 1091a. Nonetheless, it contended that it still could
take advantage of that provision in advancing its claim. In its Disclosure
Statement, Dunstone claimed that “the lack of limitations and laches
defense outlined in 20 U.S.C. 1091a—and inherent in [Ms. Baker’s]

United States v. King, Civ. No. 2001-31, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18017 (D.V.I. Sept. 19, 2002).
111. No. 14-95-00037-CV, 1996 WL 65385 (Tex. App. Feb. 15, 1996).
112. Id. at *1–*2. However, even the Cortigene court recognized that Section 1091a has a
limited scope: “[Section] 1091a exempts certain institutions and agencies from state statutes of
limitations when seeking a judgment against a borrower of a defaulted student loan.” Id. at *1 n.1.
113. See supra Part I.C.
114. See supra Part II.B.
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student loans as they were issued, serviced and guaranteed by agencies
with agreements with the federal government as outlined in the statute—
followed those loans into the secondary market.”115
This claim, if accepted, would be extremely far-reaching. In fact, it
would apply to any holder of a student loan. Dunstone considered section
1091a applicable when a loan is “issued, serviced [or] guaranteed by
agencies with agreements with the federal government.”116 However, all
federally guaranteed student loans are either “issued,” “serviced,” or
“guaranteed” by the federal government or its agencies—otherwise, they
are not part of the federal student loan program. Thus, Dunstone’s claim
is that because of section 1091a, student loans are inherently exempt
from statutes of limitations and that this exemption follows the loans and
extends universally to all holders of the loans.
2. The analogy to interest rates
The sole substantive basis for Dunstone’s claim is an analogy to
interest rates; Dunstone admitted that it “has not been able to locate a
published decision squarely holding that 20 U.S.C. § 1091a benefits
[Dunstone].”117 Dunstone asserted that
case law related to the transfer of original interest rates exported by a
nationally chartered bank, and their effect on usury law when a debt is
sold in the secondary market, indicates that the original traits of the
student loan at issue – including the lack of limitations and laches
defenses – followed the loan into the secondary market and thereby
[Dunstone] takes the benefit of 20 U.S.C. § 1091a.118

Dunstone cited three cases in support of its argument. The first,
Nichols v. Fearson,119 is an 1833 United States Supreme Court case that
arose when the endorser of a promissory note sold the note at a discount,

115. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement at 6 (on file with author).
116. Id. Dunstone used an “and” instead of an “or.” However, Ms. Baker’s loans were
“issued” and “serviced” by Merabank, a private bank. She only fit under the third prong—her loan
was guaranteed by an “agency” that had an agreement with the federal government: USA Funds,
Arizona’s guaranty agency. See Education Resource Organizations Directory, State Guaranty
Agency, http://wdcrobcolp01.ed.gov/programs/erod/org_list. cfm?category_cd=SGA (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005). Thus, for Ms. Baker, Dunstone’s claim was that because a guaranty agency
guaranteed the loan, the loan was automatically completely immune from statutes of limitations
under section 1091a.
117. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement, supra note 115, at 4.
118. Id.
119. 32 U.S. 103 (1833).
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without being discharged from its endorsement.120 When the purchaser
later sued to recover from the endorser, the endorser argued that
repayment would allow the note’s purchaser to recover an “interest rate”
greater than that allowable by local usury laws.121 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that there was no usury, in part because it
is a cardinal rule “that a contract, which, in its inception, is unfaffected
[sic] by usury, can never be invalidated by any subsequent usurious
transaction.”122
Dunstone then cited two federal circuit court cases, FDIC v.
Lattimore Land Corporation123 and Krispin v. May Department Stores
Company.124 In Lattimore, a Fifth Circuit case, a real estate corporation
had taken out a high-priced loan from the Hamilton Mortgage
Corporation, located in Georgia.125 When the mortgage corporation later
began to struggle financially, it assigned a partial interest in the note to
the also-struggling Hamilton National Bank of Tennessee, which charged
the real estate corporation interest ranging from 10½% to 11½%.126
When the real estate corporation defaulted on the loan and was sued for
repayment, it argued that the Hamilton National Bank had violated the
National Bank Act, which mandated that the bank charge no more than
Tennessee’s 10% maximum rate.127 The Fifth Circuit rejected the real
estate corporation’s defense, concluding that
[u]nder these circumstances, the Tennessee interest limit of 10% does
not apply because a transfer of a pre-existing debt to a national bank
does not cause the National Bank Act to mandate the application of the
usury law of the state where the national bank is located. . . . Applying
normal choice of law rules to the present case, we think the Georgia
usury laws should guide this Court and the note, initially non-usurious,
remains so.”128

Dunstone’s interpretation of this case was that “the Lattimore court
effectively held that the usury law originally applicable to the debt when
it was originated followed the debt when it was assigned to another
120. Id.
121. Id. at 103–04.
122. Id. at 109.
123. 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1981).
124. 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000).
125. Lattimore, 656 F.2d at 140.
126. Id. at 140, 146. The bank and mortgage corporation eventually were declared insolvent
and the FDIC acquired a complete interest in the note. Id. at 140.
127. Id. at 146.
128. Id. at 147–49 (footnote omitted).
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state.”129
In Krispin, the other case cited by Dunstone, May Department Stores
had issued credit cards to customers, to be governed by Missouri usury
law; that law prohibited delinquency fees of more than $10.130 However,
the store retained the right to unilaterally alter the agreement. In 1996,
May exercised that right and notified the customers that “effective
immediately, credit is being extended by the May National Bank of
Arizona”—a wholly-owned but independent subsidiary of the
department store.131 The department store purchased the banks’
receivables on a daily basis,132 which, according to Dunstone, meant that
“the accounts were effectively sold on the secondary market as soon as
they were funded.”133 Because of the daily assignments, the actual
collection of any late fees was done by the store.134 The Krispin lawsuit
arose after late payment fees were raised to $15 and the credit card
holders filed a class action lawsuit, challenging the late fees as usurious
under Missouri law.135 The court determined, however, that Missouri law
did not apply. Even though the original contract was to be governed by
Missouri law, the court determined that there was nothing restricting
assignment of the credit agreements to the Arizona bank.136 Further,
because “it is now the bank, and not the store, that issues credit . . . and
sets such terms as interest and late fees[,] . . . it makes sense to look to
the originating entity (the bank), and not the ongoing assignee (the store),
in determining [what law] applies.”137 Dunstone’s summary of Krispin
was that “[t]he 8th Circuit, like the 5th Circuit, sees the original interest
rate as following a debt when it is sold or assigned.”138
Dunstone then analogized these cases to section 1091a. It argued
that, like interest rates and usury laws, Section 1091a’s exemption from
limitations should also “follow” loans and exempt subsequent purchasers
from statutes of limitations. Dunstone argued that “the original traits of
the student loan at issue—including the lack of limitations and laches
defenses—followed the loan into the secondary market.”139
129. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement, supra note 115, at 5.
130. Krispin v. May Dept. Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2000).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 923.
133. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement, supra note 115, at 5.
134. Krispin, 218 F.3d at 921.
135. Id. at 922.
136. Id. at 923–24.
137. Id. at 924. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
to allege a violation of Arizona’s usury laws and remanded for a determination of that claim. See id.
at 924 n.3.
138. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement, supra note 115, at 6.
139. Id. at 4.
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3. Problems with the analogy
Dunstone’s complex interest rate analogy, although likely to
overwhelm unsophisticated debtors, is unconvincing for two reasons.
First, Dunstone misunderstood the bases of the decisions in Lattimore
and Krispin. Second, even if the cases stood for the principles that
Dunstone claimed they did, Dunstone’s analogy is inapplicable in the
context of section 1091a because whereas whether a loan is usurious or
not is a characteristic of the loan itself, section 1091a provides an
exemption based on a characteristic of the holder of the loan.
a. Misunderstanding the cases. The first problem with the interest
rate analogy is that it misunderstands the principles that controlled
Lattimore and Krispin. Dunstone argued that the courts found the interest
rates to be non-usurious because the usury laws and interest rates
“followed” the loans as they passed from one party to another. The more
credible explanation, as described below, is that the court in Lattimore
was merely following standard choice of law principles and that the
decision in Krispin was based on complete preemption by the National
Banking Act.
(1) The Restatement rule and Lattimore. The decision in
Lattimore was based, not on Dunstone’s “usury law following a debt”
rule, but on standard conflict of laws principles. The prevailing conflict
of laws rule can be found in section 203 of the Restatement (Second) on
Conflict of Laws,140 which uses this formulation:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury
if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which
the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of
the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise
applicable law under [the most significant relationship test].141

Thus, if a contract has a substantial relationship with a state in which the
contractual interest rate is considered non-usurious, the contract will be

140. All references herein to the Restatement refer to the Restatement (Second).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971). Under this section, the
state need not have the most significant relationship for its more lenient usury laws to control; it
merely needs a substantial relationship. In fact, the “greatly in excess” qualification indicates that the
section typically applies when the state does not have the most significant relationship to the
contract.
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upheld—as long as it is not “greatly in excess” of the rate permitted by
the state with the most significant relationship to the contract.
Although the Restatement rule does not specifically address the
situation of assignment to another state as took place in Lattimore, it
clearly applies to sustain interest rates in that context. The Restatement
rule validates an interest rate under a particular state’s law based on the
relationship that the contract has with that state, which is in turn based on
contacts with that state. An assignment to a party in another state could
alter the contract’s relationship with the first state by altering the contacts
with that state, but such alteration would be limited; it could not change
where the borrower is located, where the contract was signed and
negotiated, where the original lender was located, or where the loan was
made—all of which are relevant contacts for purposes of the rule.142 The
only relevant contact that transfer to another state could significantly
affect is the location where the money is to be paid, and it will not even
necessarily do that. Moreover, the Restatement comment indicates that
the location where the money is to be paid is a contact that is “likely to
be suspect” because it can “readily be manipulated.”143 Thus, that contact
is almost never determinative. Therefore, because assignment alone
will—practically speaking—never sufficiently alter the relationship of a
state to a contract to make application of that state’s usury law improper,
assignment alone can never make a non-usurious loan into a usurious
one. This Restatement rule is not based on any notion of usury laws
“following” debts, but is instead based on principles of comity,
protection of justified expectations, and promotion of state policies.144
The Restatement rule supports the court’s decision in Lattimore. The
original parties to the contract were both domiciled in Georgia, the
contract was signed in Georgia, and the contract was to be performed in
Georgia. In fact, “[t]he sole Tennessee connection of this transaction is
the fact that Hamilton Mortgage and Hamilton National Bank were
apparently Tennessee corporations.”145 The comments to section 203 of

142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (listing as relevant
contacts “(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.”).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. c (1971).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing the relevant
factors for choice of law as “(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied”).
145. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148 n.16. (5th Cir.
1981).
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the Restatement indicate that:
The state where the borrower is domiciled . . . will almost surely be a
state of substantial relationship. And so too will be the state of
performance, which is the state where the loan is to be repaid, provided
that the state bears a normal and natural relationship to the contract.
The same will be true of the state where the loan was made, if, at least,
some other contact related to the contract is located there.146

Thus, Georgia would have a sufficiently “substantial relationship”—the
Restatement’s term—for its more generous usury law to apply.147 And,
even if Tennessee was presumed to be the state with the “most
significant relationship,” because the interest rate at issue in Lattimore
was not “greatly in excess” of that allowed in Tennessee—the difference
being less than two percent148—the contract would still not be considered
usurious.
The Lattimore opinion itself shows that the decision was based on
conflict of law principles and not Dunstone’s amorphous “following”
principle. In a lengthy footnote,149 the court listed multiple reasons for
the application of Georgia law, reasons that closely paralleled the
Restatement factors:
The contract was executed and to be performed in Georgia, with
payment to be made to Hamilton Mortgage in Savannah. The land
which was the subject of the security deed was in Georgia. The obligors
were also Georgians. The sole Tennessee connection of this transaction
is the fact that Hamilton Mortgage and Hamilton National Bank were
apparently Tennessee corporations.150

Further, the court relied on a Georgia choice of law statute requiring that
“[e]very contract shall bear interest according to the law of the place of
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. c (1971).
147. In fact, the contacts with Georgia were such that it likely was the state with the most
significant relationship to the contract, making the last phrase of section 203 inapplicable. The court
apparently thought so. See Lattimore, 656 F.2d at 148 n.16 (“In fact, Georgia is the only state with
any interest in the case because all the parties (aside from the FDIC) are Georgia residents [some of
whom] ironically strain to argue for the application of Tennessee law.”).
148. Id. at 146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. b (1971)
(“Upholding a contract against the charge of usury by the application of the local law of one state,
which has a substantial relationship to the transaction and the parties, can hardly affect adversely the
interests of another state when the stipulated interest is only a few percentage points higher than
would be permitted by the local law of the other state.”) (emphasis added).
149. See Lattimore, 656 F.2d at 148 n.16.
150. Id.
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the contract, unless upon its face it shall be apparent that the intention of
the parties referred the execution of the contract to another forum.”151 As
the court concluded, “by any reasonable interpretation of Georgia
conflicts law, the Georgia courts would consider the present note to have
been intended to be a Georgia note, to be measured under Georgia usury
laws.”152 Assignment to an out-of-state party would not change the place
of contract, and thus would not change the applicable usury law. Thus,
Dunstone incorrectly interpreted Lattimore.
(2) Preemption in Krispin. Similarly, the decision in Krispin was
not based on Dunstone’s “following” principle, but on preemption by the
National Banking Act. The relevant issue in that case was whether the
credit card holders could state a claim against the Missouri store—as
assignee of the Arizona bank—under Missouri’s usury law. The court
held that, because the National Bank Act “completely preempt[s] state
law claims of usury brought against a national bank,” the question was
“whether appellants’ suit against the store actually amounted, at least in
part, to a state law usury claim against the bank.”153 If so, then the claim
would be completely preempted by the National Bank Act, under which
Arizona’s, not Missouri’s, usury law would apply.154
The court ultimately concluded that the credit card holders could not
avoid application of the National Bank Act by suing the assignee of the
bank rather than the bank itself. Although the store and the bank were
affiliated, the court noted that the two entities were “required to maintain
arms’-length transactions” and that the two entities had “entered into an
agreement completely transferring authority over all customer credit
accounts.”155 The daily assignment of the accounts to the store did not
affect the ability of the bank to rely on the National Bank Act in setting

151. Id. (quoting Ga. Code. Ann. § 57–106 (1977).
152. Id.
153. Krispin v. May Dept. Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000).
154. The Act allows “any national banking association to charge interest at the rate allowed by
the laws of the state in which the bank is located.” Id. at 922. Under the Restatement conflict of laws
rule, found in section 203, Arizona would not necessarily have had a “substantial relationship” with
the contract, because its only connection was the location of the lender. The Restatement comments
list the “domicil and principal place of business of the lender” as significant, although not
determinative, contacts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. c. Cf.
Huchingson v. Republic Fin. Co., 370 S.W.2d 185 (Ark. 1963) (finding that a state did not have a
substantial connection to a contract even though that state was the place of payment and the location
of the lender’s principal place of business). However, under the Full Faith & Credit Clause,
Congress has the power to override normal conflict of laws principles and to provide for standard
choice of law rules. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It did so in enacting the National Bank Act; therefore,
the Act’s usury provision controls, even though standard conflict of laws rules might come to a
different conclusion.
155. Krispin, 218 F.3d at 923.
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its late fees. This is not because, as Dunstone argued, the original interest
rate or the Arizona usury law “follow[s] a debt when it is sold or
assigned”;156 rather, it is because the National Bank Act preempts state
usury laws. If the credit card holders in Krispin were allowed to impede
the store’s collection efforts by suing under state usury laws, that would
interfere with the ongoing credit card agreements still in force with the
bank. In essence, it would prevent the bank from charging the fees which
Congress explicitly allowed it to charge under the National Bank Act. It
was these considerations, not Dunstone’s “following” principle, that
drove the decision in Krispin.
b. “Inherent” characteristics. Even if Lattimore and Krispin did
stand for the proposition that interest rates and usury laws “follow”
loans, that proposition cannot be carried over into the context of section
1091a. Dunstone’s analogy conflates a situation where a loan has a
certain characteristic with one where the holder of a loan has a relevant
characteristic.
In a sense, Dunstone is correct that an interest rate “follows” a loan.
The interest rate states a relationship between the amount that the
borrower borrows and the amount that he or she must eventually repay.
Regardless of any subsequent resale or assignment of a loan, the interest
rate remains the same as to the borrower. The interest rate can thus be
said to “follow” a loan—the interest paid by the borrower is not affected
by subsequent transactions. Given the Restatement rule described above,
it is also in a sense true that a loan’s non-usurious character “follows” the
loan when it is assigned—assignment does not change the loan’s
relationship to a state so as to make that state’s usury law inapplicable.157
However, that principle cannot properly be applied to section 1091a.
Whereas a loan’s interest rate or non-usurious character is an attribute of
the loan, the section 1091a exemption from limitations is not. In other
words, the section 1091a exemption is not granted because of some
characteristic of the loan; rather, it is granted to the entities listed in the
statute because of who they are: the federal government and entities
administering the federal lending program. The legislative history
supports this interpretation; Congress was trying to allow the listed
entities additional leeway in collecting long-defaulted loans.158 Thus, the
156. Plaintiff’s Disclosure Statement, supra note 115, at 6.
157. When the interest incident to a loan falls within the legal limit when made, the applicable
law can be seen as “making” the loan non-usurious. This attribute of not being usurious controls
even when the loan is sold or assigned, even if discounted such that the extended purchaser’s return
would be usurious if it was the interest rate of the initial loan. Thus, the loan’s non-usurious
character can be seen as “following” the loan.
158. See supra Part III.B.1.
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analogy to interest rates must fail, and with it falls the argument that all
loan holders are exempt from statutes of limitations under section 1091a.
B. An Argument for Application of Section 1091a to Some Extended
Purchasers
Although section 1091a should not apply universally to all non-listed
entities, one limited class of non-listed entities should fall under the
statute’s umbrella: extended purchasers who take assignment of
defaulted student loans from one of the entities listed in section 1091a.
First, this section discusses (1) the law of assignment, particularly in
regard to defaulted student loans, and (2) the rights generally available to
assignees. It then argues, based on analogies to two separate lines of
precedent, that section 1091a’s statutory exemption from statutes of
limitations should—as a matter of federal common law—follow a
student loan when it is assigned.159
1. Assignment and “personal” rights
An “assignment” is “a transfer of property or some other right from
one person (the ‘assignor’) to another (the ‘assignee’), which confers a
complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee.”160 The
“general rule” in case of assignment is that
the assignment of a claim or a chose in action without any indication of
an intention by the parties to restrict its operation vests the assignee
with all the rights and remedies possessed by or available to the
assignor, except those that are personal to the assignor and for his or
her benefit only. In other words, if a contrary intention is not shown, an
assignment ordinarily passes whatever is necessary to make it
completely effectual.161

Therefore, if the original possessor of a claim had certain rights, any
159. Of course, because Ms. Baker’s loan, see supra Part II.B, had not come to Dunstone by
way of assignment from one of the entities listed in section 1091a, Dunstone could not have taken
advantage of this argument.
160. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (2003) (footnote omitted). “An assignment is [a]
voluntary act, unlike a court order directing an involuntary transfer of property, interests or
rights. . . . An assignment is a formal transfer of property or property rights from one to
another . . . .” 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 2 (2003) (footnote omitted).
161. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 172 (2003) (footnotes omitted). See also 6A C.J.S.
Assignments § 92 (2003) (“Unless a contrary intention is manifest or inferable, an assignment
ordinarily carries with it all rights, remedies, and benefits which are incidental to the thing assigned,
except those which are personal to the assignor and for his or her benefit only.”).
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assignee of that claim generally receives those same rights—thus serving
the policy of passing along whatever is needed to make the assignment
“completely effectual.”
However, there is an important qualification—an assignee does not
acquire rights “that are personal to the assignor and for his or her benefit
only.”162 According to one court’s widely cited definition, “rights
‘personal’ to the assignor are those which, although relating to the
property assigned, constitute accrued causes of action that may be
asserted independently of ownership of the property.”163 Some rights that
have been held to be personal are: the right to recover for overpayment
on a subsequently assigned contract,164 the right to sue in federal court,165
personal covenants,166 the right to rescission of a securities transaction,167
the right to sue for trespass,168 and the right to sue for fraud.169 These
kinds of rights do not pass with assignment and are thus unavailable to
assignees.
2. Applying the “general rule” to student loans
It is a close question whether the section 1091a exemption continues
with assignment of a student loan. If the assignor was an entity listed in
section 1091a, then it was exempt from statutes of limitations in
collecting on the loan. Under the general rule of assignment, then, an
assignee of the student loan presumptively could also avail itself of the
section 1091a exemption—the right to collect free from limitations
would pass along with assignment of the loan.170 However, the
presumption does not apply if that exemption is “personal to the

162. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 172.
163. Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1994).
164. Riverside Health Sys., Inc. v. Unruh, No. 90,370, 2003 WL 22479600, at *4 (Kan. Ct.
App. Oct. 31, 2003).
165. Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1997); LLP Mortgage Ltd. v. Vasicek,
227 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (D.N.D. 2002).
166. 718 Assocs., Ltd. v. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App. 1999).
167. Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 566 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
168. Breidecker v. Gen. Chem. Co., 47 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1931).
169. Heian v. Fischer, 63 P.2d 518 (Wash. 1937); Huston v. Ohio & Colo. Smelting & Ref.
Co., 165 P. 251 (Colo. 1917).
170. This would also fit with the general rule’s underlying policy, since exemption from
limitations is necessary for the assignment to be “completely effectual” if assignment occurs after an
enforceable statute of limitations has passed. Passing along the exemption would also allow the
government more flexibility in its approach to student loan collection—the market of potential
purchasers of long-defaulted loans would be much larger. It would also allow more and a greater
variety of private resources, rather than just limited government resources, to be devoted to
collection of defaulted loans.
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assignor.”171 The critical question, then, is whether the section 1091a
exemption is, for purposes of assignment, personal to the entities listed in
section 1091a. If so, then that exemption is simply unavailable to
assignees; if not, then assignees should be exempt to the same extent as
assignors.
Based on the definition of personal rights given above, one can make
a strong argument that the section 1091a exemption is not a personal
right.172 That is, the exemption from statutes of limitations is not a
“cause[] of action that may be asserted independently of ownership of
the property.”173 Although no court has addressed this precise question in
relation to section 1091a, two lines of cases have confronted an
analogous question in the context of other federal statutes. As explained
below, although there is some conflict in the holdings, the better
reasoned cases have concluded—as a matter of federal common law—
that extended federal limitations periods are not personal to assignors and
thus are available to assignees. By analogy we can conclude that section
1091a’s exemption is also not personal to the entities listed in the statute
and should pass to assignees of student loans when assignment is from an
entity listed in the statute.
a. Small Business Administration cases. First, a series of cases
addressing assignment from the United States Small Business
Administration (“SBA”)174 can be analogized to section 1091a because
of the similarity between the federal student loan program and the federal
small business loan program. As with the FFEL student loan program,
small business loans are made by private lenders but guaranteed by the
SBA. Should the borrower default, the SBA will repay the lender and
take assignment of the loan—just like a guaranty agency will do in the
case of defaulted student loans. Also, as with student loans, the time in
which the SBA can collect on small business loan is governed by federal
law;175 the SBA is not subject to state statutes of limitations.176 As
explained below, although courts have disagreed as to whether assignees
of SBA loans can take advantage of the federal limitations period, the
better reasoning is that they can. By analogy, then, assignees of the
entities listed in section 1091a should be able to take advantage of that
171. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 172.
172. See text accompanying footnote 163.
173. Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1994).
174. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–657g (2002).
175. Recall that even before section 1091a was amended to eliminate statutes of limitations it
provided a federal limitations period that preempted any state limitations period. See supra notes 39–
40.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 946 F. Supp. 915, 918–21 (D. Utah 1996).
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statute’s exemption from limitations.
(1) Applying the federal SBA limitations period to assignees. In
the case of UMLIC VP LLC v. Matthias,177 a corporation borrowed
money under the federal small business loan program so that it could set
up a bakery and store in the Virgin Islands.178 The corporation signed a
mortgage in connection with the loan, and when it defaulted, the SBA
repaid the private lender, then took assignment of the mortgage and
resold it on the extended market.179 After a series of assignments, the
mortgage ended up in the hands of UMLIC, which filed suit against the
borrower corporation. The corporation argued that the Virgin Islands
statute of limitations barred collection of the loan; UMLIC, however,
argued that as an assignee of the SBA it should be able to take advantage
of the federal statute of limitations that would have been available to the
SBA.180
The Third Circuit agreed with UMLIC that “an assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor—here the United States—and thus . . . the federal
limitations periods apply to it as they would if the United States itself
brought a foreclosure action.”181 The court gave three supporting reasons
for its conclusion. First, “an assignee stood in the shoes of the assignor at
common law.”182 Second, the court quoted the Restatement rule that
where “A lends money to B and assigns his right to C[,] C’s right is
barred by the Statute of Limitations when A’s right would have been.”183
The Matthias court could “see no reason that the inverse should not hold
as well.”184 Third, the court looked to public policy, determining that
“affording assignees of the United States the same rights as the United
States is desirable because it improves the marketability of instruments
held by the United States, thereby giving the United States greater
flexibility in monetizing its claims.”185
177. 364 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 128.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 131.
181. Matthias, 364 F.3d at 131.
182. Id. at 133. The court did not address the “personal to the assignor” limitation. It is unclear
whether that is because it found that exception to be inapplicable or because it was never raised or
litigated.
183. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 cmt. b, ex. 3).
184. Id.
185. Id. The court eventually concluded that because no federal limitations statute applied to
this situation, “we are left with the result that there is no federally provided statute of limitations for
[this situation].” Id. at 134. In United States v. Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996), another SBA
case, the court reached a similar holding—”an assignee of the federal government may invoke the
[federal] six-year statute of limitations in enforcing its right to collect on the debt.” Id. at 890.
However, because the assignment in that case was solely for the purposes of collection, not a
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(2) A contrary case. However, decisions in this area have not been
unanimous. In Long, Long & Kellerman, P.C., v. Wheeler,186 the Virginia
Supreme Court decided a case where a couple had defaulted on their
SBA-guaranteed loan. The couple had signed a deed of trust that was
eventually assigned to Long, Long & Kellerman, P.C., as trustee.187
When the trustee sued on the loan—twenty-one years after the date of the
deed of trust—the couple defended on the basis of Virginia’s twenty-year
statute of limitations.188 The trustee claimed that, as assignee of the SBA,
it was not subject to the state statute of limitations. Although the court
agreed that the SBA itself would not have been bound by the state
limitations period, it rejected the claim that the trustee “stands in the
shoes of the federal assignor and is not barred from foreclosing by virtue
of any Virginia statute of limitations.”189 Rather, the court held that “the
rationale underlying the rule that the federal government is immune to
the operation of statutes of limitations would not be served by permitting
a private assignee to enjoy perpetual immunity from a statute of
limitations for a purely private benefit.”190 In effect, it found that the
SBA exemption from state statutes of limitations is a private right of the
government.
However, three of the seven justices in Wheeler dissented.191 They
concluded that “[t]he right to enforce [a] contract or instrument is one of
the “‘rights, remedies and benefits which are incidental to the thing
assigned’ . . . and not merely a right ‘personal to the assignor and for [its]
benefit only.’”192 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s “perpetual
immunity” public policy analysis, since “this involves a public policy
matter that is solely within the province of Congress, and it has seen fit
to enact [the federal limitations statute] without any restriction upon
those who may benefit from the absence of a limitation period.”193 The
dissent thus considered the federal exemption to not be personal.
(3) Analysis. The rationale of the Matthias court and the Wheeler
dissent can easily be carried over into the context of section 1091a.

complete assignment, id. at 891, it is much weaker as an analogy for the principle argued for here.
186. 570 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2002).
187. Id. at 823.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 824–25.
190. Id. at 826.
191. Id. See VA. CONST. art. 6 § 2 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of seven justices.”).
192. Wheeler, 570 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting Union Recovery Ltd. P’ship v. Horton, 477 S.E.2d
521, 524 (Va. 1996) (quoting Wamco, III, Ltd. v. First Piedmont Mortgage Corp., 856 F. Supp.
1076, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1994))).
193. Id. at 827.
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Those judges considered the federal statute of limitations for SBA loans
to not be “personal” to the government; by analogy, section 1091a’s
federal exemption from limitations periods should also not be considered
personal. Moreover, this interpretation of section 1091a would further
the important policy mentioned by the Matthias court: the government
would have greater “flexibility in monetizing its claims” because of the
improved “marketability” of student loans that are not subject to statutes
of limitations.194
Of course, the holding of the majority in the Wheeler case would pull
the other direction; by analogy to that holding, the exemption in section
1091a would be personal to the listed entities. Allowing the exemption to
pass with an assigned student loan would “permit[] a private assignee to
enjoy perpetual immunity from a statute of limitations for a purely
private benefit,”195 a result the Wheeler majority found distasteful.
As between these two analyses, the first—found in the Wheeler
dissent and the Matthias holding—is more persuasive. Both cases
recognized that the matter cannot be resolved by looking to the terms of
the SBA statute. Thus, each court turned to policy reasons and precedent
to support its view. The policy reasons advanced by the federal Matthias
court, more expert in its interpretation of federal law, persuasively
contradict the bare majority in Wheeler. Unless assignment carries with it
the federal statute of limitations, then the federal government will be
unable to “monetize” its claims other than through direct collection. In
addition, the common law rule of assignment should apply to SBA loans,
as both the Wheeler dissent and the Matthias court recognized, since the
federal statutes do not restrict that rule.
The Wheeler majority apparently relied on a conclusion that since
Congress had not specified a federal statute of limitations time period,
the state statute of limitations stepped in to fill that void. However, this
fails to give appropriate weight to Congress’ preemption in the area of
the SBA or to the common law rule of assignment. It is true that
Congress did not specify a limitations period, in years, in which SBA
suits need to be brought. However, (as even the Wheeler majority
recognized), the limitations period under the SBA is a question of federal
law, which should preempt state statutes of limitations. Since the deed of
trust itself expressly stated that it “is to be construed and enforced in
accordance with applicable Federal law,”196 the federal rule of
limitations—in that case, that state limitations do not apply—should have
passed along with assignment of the loan. As for the Wheeler majority’s
194. Matthias, 364 F.3d at 133.
195. Wheeler, 570 S.E.2d at 826.
196. Id. at 538 (Carrico, C.J., dissenting).
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policy analysis, it is understandable that the court found it repugnant for
a “private assignee to enjoy perpetual immunity from a statute of
limitations for purely private benefit.”197 However, the court overlooked
that this arrangement also benefits the federal government by giving it
greater “flexibility in monetizing its claims.”198 The federal policy should
outweigh the court’s distaste for private exemption from limitations.
Thus, the Wheeler decision was mistaken in its analysis; the better
holding is that the SBA’s limitations exemption should pass with
assignment of SBA loans. The SBA therefore provides a fitting analogy
for extension of section 1091a’s exemption to non-listed entities.
b. FIRREA cases. A second line of cases provides perhaps an even
stronger argument by analogy for applying the section 1091a exemption
to assignees of the listed entities. The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)199 was enacted in
response to the “declining financial condition of the nation’s banks and
savings and loan institutions.”200 Among other things, the FIRREA
created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”), which can act as receivers or
conservators for failing financial institutions.201 Part of the FIRREA
provides that
[n]otwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute
of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Corporation as
conservator or receiver shall be—
(i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of—
(I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law.202

Although “the Corporation” refers literally to the FDIC, the RTC is
granted identical powers by statute.203 This provision is analogous to
section 1091a: under the FIRREA, when a listed entity (the RTC or
FDIC) takes over a financial institution as a conservator or receiver,
“[n]otwithstanding” other limitations, it has at least six years to bring a
197. Id. at 826.
198. Matthias, 364 F.3d at 133.
199. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
200. RTC v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Henderson v. Bank of New
England, 986 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1993).
201. See supra note 31.
202. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (1994).
203. See id. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (1994).
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cause of action. Similarly, under 1091a, when a listed entity (guaranty
agency, etc.) holds a loan that is in default, “[n]otwithstanding” any other
limitation, it has an indefinite period to bring a cause of action. As
explained below, numerous cases have applied the FIRREA’s limitations
period to assignees of the FDIC or RTC. These cases can properly be
analogized to section 1091a, indicating that its exemption from
limitations should also apply to assignees of the listed entities.
(1) Applying the FIRREA to assignees. Numerous courts have
interpreted the FIRREA limitations period to extend to assignees of the
FDIC or RTC; this sub-section summarizes only a few. One of the most
complete expositions of the issue can be found in FDIC v. Bledsoe,204 a
Fifth Circuit case. When faced with the question of whether an assignee
of the FDIC can use the extended limitations period available to the
FDIC, the Bledsoe court properly noted that the language of the FIRREA
is silent regarding the issue.205 However, “[i]t is an axiomatic principle of
statutory construction that in effectuating Congress’ intent courts are to
fill the inevitable statutory gaps by reference to the principles of the
common law.”206 Relying on the common-law doctrine that “[a]n
assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor,” the court concluded that an
assignee of the FDIC was also covered by the federal statute of
limitations that would have applied to the FDIC.207 Furthermore, as a
policy matter,
to hold that assignees are relegated to the state statute of limitations
would serve only to shrink the private market for the assets of failed
banks. It would require the FDIC to hold onto and prosecute all notes
for which the state statute of limitations has expired because such
obligations would be worthless to anyone else.208

Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court in Jackson v. Thweatt209
addressed the rights of FDIC assignees. The Jackson court noted that the
express statutory language refers only to the FDIC, but relied on the
same common law “stands in the shoes” maxim as had the Bledsoe court
to apply the longer limitations period to the FDIC’s assignee.210 The

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
Id. at 174.
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court expressed a policy similar to that relied on by the Bledsoe court:
“[i]f the FDIC’s statute of limitations did not enure to the benefit of its
transferees, the market value of notes and other assets in the hands of the
FDIC would be diminished,”211 because it would “shrink the private
market for the assets of failed banks.”212 Ultimately, “while the statute
alone might not vest any rights in transferees, the statute combined with
the common law of assignment does.”213 Moreover, the Jackson court
specifically addressed and rejected the argument that the FIRREA statute
of limitations was “personal” to the FDIC.214 It stated that “rights
‘personal’ to the assignor are those which, although relating to the
property assigned, constitute accrued causes of action that may be
asserted independently of ownership of the property.”215 Because the
extended FIRREA statute of limitations “confers no benefit independent
of the asset to which it relates,” the court found it to not be personal.216
Other courts have followed this same reasoning,217 including the
First,218 Ninth,219 and Tenth Circuits.220 In addition, several
commentators have advocated applying the FIRREA statute of
limitations to assignees.221 In each case, the FIRREA limitations period
has been determined to not be a right “personal to the assignor.”
(2) The Fourth Circuit split. However, the cases have not been
unanimous—in fact, due to a divergent view in the Fourth Circuit, the

211. Id.
212. Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 174 (quoting Fall v. Keasler, No. C 90 20643 SW (ARB), 1991
WL 340182, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991)).
213. Id.at 175.
214. Id. at 176.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Bruin Holdings, Inc. v. Moderski, 960 F. Supp. 62 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Fall, No. C 90 20643
SW (ARB), 1991 WL 340182; Mountain States Fin. Res. Corp. v. Agrawal, 777 F. Supp. 1550
(W.D. Okla. 1991); Union Recovery Ltd. P’ship v. Horton, 477 S.E.2d 521 (Va. 1996); Tivoli
Ventures, Inc. v. Bumann, 870 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1994); Cadle Co. II v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan.
1993); Cent. States Res. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 501 N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1993); Nat’l Loan
Investors Ltd. P’ship v. Heritage Square Assocs., 733 A.2d 876 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
218. Beckley Capital Ltd. P’ship v. DiGeronimo, 184 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (accepting the
“policy rationale for allowing the assignee the benefit of the FIRREA statute of limitations,” but
refusing to extend that benefit where the policy was inapplicable).
219. United States v. Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, however,
addressed a slightly different situation. See supra note 186.
220. UMLIC-Nine Corp. v. Lipan Springs Dev. Corp., 168 F.3d 1173, 1177 n.3 (10th Cir.
1999).
221. See Brian J. Woram, FIRREA’s Statutes of Limitations: Their Availability to Purchasers
from the FDIC, 110 BANKING L.J. 292 (1993); James J. Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American
Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC’s Six Year Statute of Limitations to Third Party Purchasers, 24 TEX.
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circuits are split.222 The Fourth Circuit’s position began to emerge when
a federal district court in Virginia decided Wamco, III, Ltd. v. First
Piedmont Mortgage Corp.223 There, the district court—although
recognizing the contrary trend—determined that the FIRREA’s extended
limitations period is a right that is personal to the RTC (or FDIC). The
basis for the decision was that, in the court’s view, “the remedial benefit
conferred by the [FIRREA] is explicitly tied to the status of the entity on
which it is conferred.”224 That is to say, because the statute “by its plain
terms . . . applies in actions brought by the RTC in its capacity as either
conservator or receiver,” and not otherwise, “the statute confers a benefit
that is personal to RTC.”225 The court criticized the contrary cases
because “[f]or the most part, those decisions ignore the actual language
of the statute and decide the issue on the basis of the common law of
assignments and policy considerations.”226 Ultimately, the court decided
that although
there are valid policy reasons which can be advanced for interpreting
the statute in another fashion[,] . . . Congress has spoken plainly to
confer a benefit on a particular entity functioning in a particular status,
[and] it is not for the courts to assess the various policy considerations
which would support having enacted the statute to provide
otherwise.227

The court thus applied the Virginia state statute of limitations, rather than
the longer FIRREA limitations period, to the debt at issue.228
A little over two years later, the same court again addressed the issue
of FIRREA’s statute of limitations as applied to assignees. In National
Enterprises, Inc. v. R.G. Moore,229 the RTC, as receiver for a bank, had
assigned a note to National Enterprises, “a California corporation.”230
National Enterprises filed suit within the FIRREA’s six-year statute of

222. Compare Beckley Capital Ltd. P’ship, 184 F.3d at 52, UMLIC-Nine Corp., 168 F.3d at
1173, Thornburg, 82 F.3d at 886, and FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993) with Fed. Fin.
Co. v. Hall, 108 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 1997).
223. 856 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Va. 1994).
224. Id. at 1086.
225. Id.
226. Id. The court also found the argument based on the Restatement, see supra text
accompanying notes 184–85, to be inapplicable in the case of negotiable paper due to the
Restatement’s exclusion of negotiable instruments from the scope of that section. Id. at 1087.
227. Id. at 1087–88.
228. Id. at 1088.
229. 948 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1996).
230. Id. at 568–69. The assignment was through an intermediary.

76

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 20

limitations but after the Virginia five-year statute would have passed.231
It argued that as an assignee, “it acquired the same rights as the original
assignor and therefore succeeded to the six-year statute of limitations.”232
In granting National Enterprises’ motion for summary judgment, the
Moore court curtly concluded that “under Virginia law, an assignee of an
instrument acquires any right of the assignor to enforce that instrument,
and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to the six-year statute of
limitations.”233 Although the court cited Wamco,234 it did not explain how
that apparently contradictory case was distinguishable.
An opportunity for the Fourth Circuit to resolve this intra-circuit split
arose the next year. In Federal Financial Co. v. Hall,235 an RTC assignee
claimed that by virtue of the FIRREA’s longer limitations period, the
Virginia statute of limitations did not bar collection of a loan.236 The
Fourth Circuit noted that the “overwhelming majority” of courts apply
the longer FIRREA limitations period to assignees; the court also noted
the contrary Wamco decision (although it did not mention Moore).237 It
concluded that all the cases approached the question as a question of
federal common law; Wamco merely differed in its conclusion that the
FIRREA statute of limitations is “personal to the assignor.”238 However,
the Hall court found the initial premise—that federal common law
applied—to be flawed. Citing Supreme Court precedent to the effect that
“[c]ourts should create federal common law rules only ‘where there is a
significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law,’”239 the Fourth Circuit found there to be no such “significant
conflict.”240 Although the court recognized that “allowing a state-by-state
determination . . . would disadvantage the federal government by
reducing the value and marketability of the RTC’s asset pool,” it
concluded that “no federal policy presents a sufficient justification for a
federal common law rule of decision applying [the FIRREA limitations
period] to assignees of the RTC.”241 Instead, the court turned to Virginia
state common law, under which it nevertheless concluded that the federal
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236.
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238.
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240.
241.

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id.
108 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49 (quoting O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)).
Hall, 108 F.3d at 49.
Id.
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six-year limitations period would apply.242
(3) Resolution. The vast majority of courts, as a matter of federal
common law, extend the FIRREA’s extended limitations period to
assignees. The Fourth Circuit discussion in Hall stands in stark contrast
to the other cases, although even that court was willing to extend the
FIRREA period as a matter of state common law.243 Although the Hall
court’s approach will almost invariably lead to the same conclusion, as a
matter of state common law rather than federal common law, the Fourth
Circuit’s approach should still be rejected. That court mistakenly relied
on the rule that “when the terms of a statute are clear, . . . courts are ‘not
free to replace . . . [that clear language] with an unenacted legislative
intent.’”244 Although that is a correct principle, it assumes that the
FIRREA speaks clearly to application of that statute to assignees. It does
not.
Moreover, courts should construe the FIRREA to effectuate
Congress’ intent. The Fourth Circuit’s Hall approach, in effect, considers
Congress to have intended for fifty different rules to potentially apply,
depending on the state in which suit is brought. In addition to the
incentive that this would create to forum shop, under the Hall court’s
approach, an assignee may be able to rely on the FIRREA limitations
period, but only if the relevant state common law happens to interpret the
federal statute to mandate such a result. Surely Congress did not intend
such an illogical approach and such potentially inconsistent application
of the federal statute. Even the Hall court recognized the “strong policy
reasons for a uniform federal rule.”245 That policy, combined with the
fact that Congress did not specifically address the rights of assignees,
indicates that the unanimous approach of courts outside the Fourth
Circuit should control—the FIRREA limitations period is not a
“personal” right.
By analogy, the section 1091a exemption from limitations should
also pass with assignment of the student loan as a matter of federal
common law. It is not a right “personal” to the assignor.

242. Id. (citing Union Recovery Ltd. P’ship v. Horton, 477 S.E.2d 521 (Va. 1996)).
243. In fact, as the Hall concurrence pointed out, this made the majority’s entire discussion of
how to interpret the federal statute unnecessary. Id. at 51 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1064 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
245. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The government has a vested interest in the interpretation of section
1091a. So do the myriad investors and collection agencies, like
Dunstone, that would love to have unrestricted access to the billions of
dollars in defaulted loans. This article has attempted to determine the
proper scope of section 1091a by seeking a middle ground—an
application of the statute (to a question not addressed in the statute’s text)
that both protects the interests of the government and does not attribute
an absurd intent to Congress. It has concluded, after looking to the
decisions addressing analogous situations, that entities not listed in
section 1091a should only be able to take advantage of that statute’s
exemption if they have taken assignment from one of the entities listed in
that section. This interpretation promotes the policy of allowing the
federal government to effectively “monetize” its valid contractual claims;
restricting the exemption to those who take assignment from the listed
entities also provides the government with some measure of control over
how collections are pursued. Under a contrary approach—where nonlisted entities were not exempt from limitations periods—considerations
of state statutes of limitations, available forums, and the time necessary
to locate the debtor would slowly restrict the number of entities willing
to “buy” such loans until the government would have to either seek to
collect the loan itself or give up on collecting it.
Although under the balance suggested in this article defaulted
borrowers of student loans can still never rest easy, and are forever
potentially liable, they can at least know that only the government,
educational institutions, guaranty agencies, or their assignees are immune
to statutes of limitations.

